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[Is.L.R. Vol. 35 of judges in Israel is one of the celebrated sources of pride by scholars and politicians as regards judicial independence. This procedure was first laid down by the Judges Law, 1953 and is now part of the Basic Law: Judicature (to be incorporated into Israel's future constitution).
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In accordance with the law, appointments of judges are made by the President of the State, upon recommendation of a committee, comprising three judges of the Supreme Court, two government ministers, two Knesset members, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association. Thus, despite the fact that politicians take part in the process, the majority of the committee is composed of professionals -the judges and the members of the bar. In addition, representatives of all three branches of government plus the profession take part in the decisionmaking. Traditionally, appointments to the Supreme Court are made only if there is a wide consensus of the committee members and especially support of the three judges on the committee. However, the deliberations of this committee are in camera, and very little is known as to the dynamics of its decision-making process.
Be that as it may, the same statute, the 1953 Judges Law also empowered the Minister of Justice, after consultation with the President of the Supreme Court, to appoint judges from the district courts to the Supreme Court, on a temporary basis for one year. (This arrangement is anchored today in section 10 of the Courts Act [Consolidated Version] 1984 ). This practice, according to which one, two, and at times even three temporary appointees sit in the Supreme Court, characterizes the history of the Israeli Supreme Court since its establishment in 1948. 4 At times, such appointments are given to judges who are about to retire, and the year in the Supreme Court is an act of honor to the retiring judge. But most of these appointments are given to outstanding judges in the district courts, and this period of a year at the Supreme Court serves as some kind of test in the framework of the selection of future permanent appointments to the Supreme Court. It is difficult to view these latter appointees as having structural judicial independence. The first temporary appointments were made even before the statute setting the procedure of appointments was enacted. Shimon Agranat (later the President of the Supreme Court) served in this status from December 1948 to December 1949, and  Moshe Silberg served a year and a half as a temporary judge from December 1948 until May 1950 For the definition of structural judicial independence see Salzberger, supra n. 1.
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The aim of this paper is to examine the decision-making patterns of the temporary appointees and whether and in what way they are different from the decision-making patterns of the tenured judges. More specifically, I will examine the decision-making patterns that promote the chances of the temporary appointees to get a permanent seat on the Supreme Court. Findings in this regard can contribute to the debate which emerged in recent years within the law and economics approach and outside it with regard to positive analysis of judicial independence or to the question: why do we have independent judiciaries. The findings can also serve as a good base for a normative evaluation of the temporary appointments practice and for related questions such as the bench method (the practice according to which only three judges, out of twelve or fourteen, hear a particular case), the composition of the bench, and more.
The empirical findings in this paper are based on a database of approximately 50,000 cases handled by the Israeli Supreme Court between 1948 and 2000. This database was compiled by Professor Arye Rattner of the Department of Sociology at the University of Haifa and by myself, in the framework of a more comprehensive statistical study on the work of the Israeli Supreme Court and its judges. Naturally, the statistics of decision-making patterns cannot address each and every aspect of judicial work and its evaluation, but statistics can tell a story, indeed, even an interesting one.
The first section of this paper will provide a comparative overview of the history and practice of temporary judicial appointments. The second section will sketch the theoretical debate regarding the positive analysis of judicial independence. The third will elaborate on the database used for the current study. The empirical findings will be specified in the fourth section, to be followed, in the fifth, by some comparison with a similar study I conducted on the Court of Appeal in England and conclusions as to the general theoretical debate concerning judicial independence.
I. Temporary Appointments in Israel: Historical Background and Comparative Perspective
The practice of temporary judicial appointments exists in a wide range of countries, under common law as well as civil law, and in a comparative perspective, the Israeli arrangement is one of the least problematic vis-a-vis the independence of the judiciary. All temporary appointees 484 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Is.L.R. Vol. 35 in Israel are already practicing judges with tenure, and the only temporary component is their promotion to a higher instance. Temporary appointment is limited to one year. In England, from which the Israeli judicial system (as well as most common law countries) inherited this practice, the Lord Chancellor has wide ranging powers to appoint lower judges to higher courts and vice versa on a temporary basis. These appointments, on the one hand, are not limited in time and, on the other hand, can be made on an individual case basis. 6 In addition, the temporary appointees do not have to be practicing judges; all that is required is that they qualify for judicial appointment. 7 This is the current legal arrangement in England, but it goes back many years, and the arrangements enacted by the British Mandatory government for Palestine were in this spirit. They were much more far reaching than the current Israeli provisions. The Courts Act, 1940 authorized the High Commissioner to appoint "capable and suitable candidates to sit as judges in the district court for a period of up to two years." The Chief Justice had the authority to appoint a Supreme Court judge to sit in the district court and a district court judge to sit in the Supreme Court or another district court for a specific case or for a period of time. 8 With the establishment of the State of Israel, the powers of both the High Commissioner and the Chief Justice were transferred to the Minister of Justice. The power to appoint temporary judges to the Supreme Court was exercised as early as December 1949 when District Court Judges Shimon Agranat and Moshe Silberg were appointed on a temporary basis to the Supreme Court (enlarging the Court from five to seven judges). Agranat served as a temporary appointee for one year; Silberg, for a year and a half, before their permanent promotion to the Supreme Court. Until 1952 ten judges were appointed on a temporary basis for various periods of time. Only half of them eventually received (for some, after a considerable period of time) a permanent seat on the Supreme Court. The Judges Act, 1953 re-regulated the issue. Article 10 held that the Minister of Justice, after consultation with the President of the Supreme Court and the consent of the appointee, can appoint a district court judge to the Supreme Court on a temporary basis, for a period not exceeding one year in a period of three years.
9 Around 50 such appointments were made since the establishment of the state, only half of whom were eventually promoted on a permanent basis to the Supreme Court.
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The Law also enables the appointment of a Supreme Court judge to the district court and a district court judge to the magistrate's court on a temporary basis, providing that the judge consents. The latter authority has hardly ever been used.
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The phenomenon of temporary judicial appointments is not unique to Israel and England. Indeed, the vast majority of common law jurisdictions inherited this institution from the English judicial system. Thus, in New Zealand, the law enables the appointment of a judge on a temporary basis to the Court of Appeal (the highest instance in New Zealand) if one of the tenured judges is absent or sick or on holiday or when the President of the Court of Appeal and the President of the Supreme Court (which is the instance below the Court of Appeal) think it is beneficial to add another judge to hear a specific appeal. These provisions, unlike in most other jurisdictions, limit the grounds for temporary appointments to what is specified in the statute. However, they are more problematic from the point of view of judicial independence because they enable a temporary appointment ad-hoc to a specific case, even after its hearing has begun, when, for example, there is a disagreement among the judges already sitting on a case. 12 9
This arrangement is specified today in Art. 10 of The Courts Act [Consolidated Version], 1984. 10 Sometimes after another lengthy period at the District Court. Justice Tiirkel, for example, was temporarily appointed to the Supreme Court in 1980-1981 and in 1983-1984 . He received a permanent appointment to the Supreme Court in 1995. At least 4 other judges served twice as temporary appointees on the Supreme Court. 11 The known cases where this authority was used are the Eichman and Demjanyuk trials in which a Supreme Court judge presided over the trial court (the District Court). 12 See: Peter Spiller, "Judges at Work: The New Zealand Court of Appeal (1958 Appeal ( -1976 Appeal ( )" (1993 Australia has similar arrangements in both the federal and the provincial levels. It is one of the few places where the subject of temporary appointments received some public attention and was an issue for a public debate. The debate was provoked by remarks of a High Court judge, Justice Michael Kirby, against this practice.
13 He argued that temporary judicial appointees are likely to be biased in favor of the government or will decide cases in accordance to the government's interests, as they are dependent on the government for their promotion. This is one of the main points of our study of the decision-making patterns of temporary appointees in Israel, as will be discussed in section 4. Justice Kirby also argued that in England the problems with temporary appointments are less severe than in Australia, because the practice is well-defined and constrained by statutory regulation and that, in practice, those judges are not allocated cases in which the government has a visible interest. While some members of the Australian Bar concurred, the official stance of the Bar took an opposite view; so did the Attorney General of New South Wales. Their main argument was that temporary appointments are efficient and contribute to the shortening of delays in the courts. 14 Those defending the Australian arrangements regarding temporary appointments did not address the problems of this practice vis-a-vis judicial independence, and I think that some of the insights of Justice "The entrusting of appellate work to judges especially appointed for this purpose was designed to establish a Court of Appeal as a separate institution with a distinctive identity. However, it was important for the Government of the late 1950's to make the new system acceptable to the Supreme Court judiciary (particularly those judges who were not in line for appointment to the Court of Appeal), and minimize the perception of appointment to the Court of Appeal as promotion. The result was that the Judicature Amendment Act 1957 maintained important links between the Supreme Court and the new Court of Appeal, and these ties significantly qualified the notion of a "permanent and separate" Court of Appeal." The result, however, due to the institutional aspects is even more problematic (visa-vis judicial independence) than the old practice of whole ad-hoc benches to hear appeals. Kirby are also questionable. As I indicated above, the Lord Chancellor in England has very wide powers to appoint temporary judges, no time limits, no constraints of statutory reasons for such an appointment, and with a wide range of candidates (including non-judges). Having said that, since the powers of the Lord Chancellor also include broad discretion with regard to the appointment of permanent judges, if he wishes to tamper with judicial independence he does not have to do so through temporary appointments. Thus, the marginal potential harm in the English arrangement regarding temporary appointments is smaller than in other jurisdictions. Two additional examples of the practice of temporary appointments in the common law world are from India and Canada. The constitution of India empowers the chief justice of India, with the consent of the President and after consulting the Chief Justice of the high court concerned, to appoint to the Supreme Court a judge from the high court on a temporary basis, but with no specification of a time limit. 15 In Ontario, Canada, the President of the Supreme Court, with the consent of the President of the lower court, has the power to appoint a judge to the Supreme Court on a temporary basis. There is no limitation on the number of such appointees.
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It should be emphasized that the phenomenon of temporary appointments characterizes also the civil law jurisdictions. A Norwegian report that studied this practice concludes that this practice is shared by most countries. 17 In Norway itself temporary appointments for two years are possible and sometimes even for the purpose of an individual case. Such appointments can be of judges from lower instances, but also of lawyers with no judicial background or structural independence. 18 The Supreme Court of Norway acknowledged the problems of this arrangement and ordered (as a measure of judicial legislation) that such temporary ap- International forums acknowledged the problematic practice of temporary judicial appointments as well. The conclusions of the First Study Commission of the International Association of Judges on important issues concerning the judiciary include the following declaration:
The fundamental question to which those articles give rise is that of the appointment of temporary judges. The appointment of temporary judges, either professional or lay, is a practice that prevails in a number of countries represented on the First Commission. The question is not relevant in the case of countries where judges are elected. The Commission thought it right to confine itself to considering the appointment of temporary professional judges. The questions that arise in relation to lay judges are too complex to be dealt with in this Resolution. In the case of professional judges, a majority of members take the view that, as a matter of general principle, temporary appointment is wrong. It is acceptable only exceptionally where it is necessary for practical reasons and provided that both the appointment and any renewal of it are governed by rules subjecting them to control by the Judiciary so as to ensure that the decision is not taken solely by a political organ. The remedy against the risks inherent in that kind 19 In the case of Jens Viktor Plabte v. The State, Case No. 82 B/1997 No.108/1957 Court held: "The courts guarantee the rule of law for citizens in their relations with the legislative power and the executive power -they can try the constitutionality of laws and have judicial power to review the decisions of the executive. Since the State is a party in a considerable amount of cases decided by the courts, it is especially important that the law-seeking public can have full confidence in the individual judge making his judgment without having to consider any negative consequences for his position. of appointment is accordingly to be sought by way of the method of appointment.
That is so, in particular, in the case of the temporary appointment of retired judges to sit in the courts where they formerly sat full-time.
The Commission is thus of the opinion that, whilst the principle stated in the United Nations draft must be generally approved, the practical necessities facing many States must nonetheless be taken into account. The draft is therefore too rigid. However, whilst qualifications should be introduced into it, they should be precise in defining very strictly, in the way stated above, the method of appointment and of renewal of the appointment. The Commission considers that the question of the appointment of judges for probationary period is different. One can allow that, in countries with career judiciaries, it should be useful to require a young person to give proof of his or her capabilities during a set period before being definitely appointed. There also, however, it is essential that the decision whether to reject or appoint a candidate should be subject to the control of a judicial body.
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To conclude, the Israeli statutory arrangement, in a comparative perspective, is one of the least problematic ones from the point of view of judicial independence. First, the authority to appoint on a temporary basis is granted to the Minister of Justice, but he must consult the President of the Supreme Court and receive the consent of the relevant judge. Second, the appointment can be only of a serving judge (as opposed to the possibility to appoint practicing lawyers, which exists, for example, in England). Third, the appointment is for a maximum period of one year and is not for individual cases (save the exceptions of a Supreme Court judge presiding over an important trial court). Be that as it may, the existence of this tradition or practice in Israel allows us to examine empirically interesting questions regarding the positive analysis of judicial independence, to the theoretical framework of which I now turn. 
II. The Theoretical Debate Concerning the Positive Analysis of Judicial Independence
From a liberal, political, philosophical perspective of the state, the desirability of judicial independence is almost obvious. In order to decide disputes between individuals, judges must be objective and impartial, i.e., independent from the wishes or interests of the disputing parties. Yet, judicial independence is needed especially in disputes between individuals and the state and its organs, so that the rule of law and human rights can be effectively protected. Thus, judges ought to be independent from the wishes of the political holders of powers in concrete disputes. Judicial independence is also an important component of the concept of separation of powers, which aims to create a checks and balances mechanism in order to prevent abuse of powers by the government. 21 Furthermore, the independence of judges from other judges' views can contribute to the quality of judicial decisions, as can be ascertained from the Social Choice literature.
The distance is very great between the questions regarding the desirability of judicial independence and the question why we find in most democratic countries significant components of structural judicial independence. 22 A reply that judicial independence exists because it should exist is unacceptable according to different and varied approaches which view politicians as motivated by self-interest. The institutions of the state and their allocation of powers are constructed by different players in the public arena. If judicial independence is regulated by the constitution, we need to ask what were the interests of the constitution creators in guaranteeing such independence, especially if it can limit those same individuals in their political, post-constitutional conduct. This question is even more significant if judicial independence is provided by regular legislation in the post-constitutional stage or where there is no constitution at all, as is the case in Israel. The theoretical background of the current study emanates from a debate about the positive analysis of the independence of the judiciary or from the question: why do we find independent judges in liberal democratic countries? These questions are especially relevant within the law and economics paradigm, which assumes that politicians and other players in the public sphere are aiming to maximize their interests -their powers and chances of re-election. But even in the framework of a more "generous" or broad approach, which assumes that politicians are seeking to maximize their ideologies as well, 23 the questions regarding their interests in creating and maintaining an independent judiciary has special relevance.
Against this background, a debate has emerged in recent decades, within the law and economics movement, with regard to the positive analysis of judicial independence. On one side of this debate we can find the traditional approach, or what I call the 'obstacles' approach. It identifies between the normative argument in favor of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and its positive explanation. The roots of this approach can be found in the 17th and 18th centuries' philosophical ideas of social contract (Hobbes, Locke), which were rephrased in the second half of the 20th century in economic language by, among others, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock.
24 Separation of powers and judicial independence are viewed, within this framework, as de-monopolizing factors, as mechanisms for diminishing agency costs and as methods for increasing the costs of rent-seeking activity and decreasing the profits of interest groups and politicians from deals between them. In fulfilling this task, an independent judiciary plays the same role as bicameralism, the intermittent turnover of legislative houses, presidential veto, and other structural components of government. On the other side of this debate we can find a revisionist approach to separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, which I dub the 'fusion' approach. This approach views the separation of powers and an independent judiciary as mechanisms which help interest groups and the legislature to maximize profits from the deals between them, or which help politicians in maximizing their utility function. William Landes and Richard Posner are the pioneers of the revisionist approach. 26 They focus on the judiciary, portraying its role as equivalent to parliamentary procedural rules, which are supposed to make changes in legislation more difficult and costly. Both mechanisms, according to their model, are working on behalf of the legislature and powerful interest groups by making legislation more durable. This guaranteed durability increases the profits that the legislature and interest groups make from the deals between them.
A more recent contribution of Mark Ramsayer qualified the universality of the Landes and Posner argument, although accepting their general framework. Ramsayer argued that efforts to maintain an independent judiciary would be found only in political systems in which a frequent change of political power is likely. This, according to Ramsayer, can explain the fact that in Japan, for example, the judiciary is much less independent than in most western democracies because of the stability or lack of change of the ruling powers there.
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Robert Tollison and Mark Crain accept Posner and Landes' theory concerning the judiciary, but they go even further with their interestgroup perspective. They argue that, in the American context, the presidential veto, on the level of the federal legislature, and gubernatorial veto, on the level of states' legislatures, play the same role as the judiciary; they are designed to increase the profits of the legislature and the interest-groups. 28 Thus, Tollison and Crain cover all three branches of government and claim that all of them are joining forces to benefit powerful interest groups. Instead of separation of powers, we actually Nos. 2-3,2001] TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS 493 have collusion of powers. 29 The last nail in the constitutional coffin is hammered in by Tollison and Crain when they argue that the mere existence of a constitution and the mechanism by which it works are also part of this interest-group vision of the state.
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A different path under the heading of the "revisionist" approach in explaining the existence of independent judiciaries is taken by my theory of judicial independence. I argued that independent judges do indeed benefit politicians, but this is not due to their loyalty to the original legislature. Independent courts can be used to shift blame for unpopular collective decisions, they can decrease the effects of uncertainty from political ramifications of collective decision-making, and they can help in reducing social choice or decision-making problems. Thus, the result of their independent input into collective decisionmaking is an increase in political support for politicians. 31 However, this increase in the politicians' welfare is not necessarily at the expense of the general public, as foreseen by the Landes-Posner framework.
In other words, while, according to the traditional approach, the independence of the judiciary benefits the general public and harms 29 In a different place I criticized the Landes-Posner-Crain-Tollison approach. See:
Salzberger, supra n. 1, at 359. In a nutshell, their main problem is that their models are based on a very problematic assumption that while a dependent judiciary acts as an agent of the current government and decides cases according to the current government's wishes, making the commodity legislation less durable and thus reducing the profits of the government and interest groups, an independent judiciary decides cases according to the original legislature's will, and therefore it will make legislation more durable and thus more profitable. This pivotal underlying assumption is supported neither by Landes-Posner-Crain- politicians (and therefore, under the assumption that politicians are rational, it is hard to explain why politicians will construct and maintain such independence), and according to the Landes-Posner framework, this independence benefits politicians and harms the public, according to the third approach, the independence of the judiciary benefits both politicians and the general public, creating some kind of an equilibrium between the normative and positive analysis of the issue.
A good example for this third explanation of judicial independence are some of the functions carried out by the judiciary in Israel, and especially by the Israeli Supreme Court, among which are the role played by the Court with regard to the government's policies in the Occupied Territories and the role played by the Court in the context of the relations between state and religion. In both areas it can be argued that politicians delegated decision-making powers to the Court. It was already in 1967, a few days after the end of the Six Days War, that the Supreme Court was asked to hear an application of an individual from the Occupied Territories. The State representative did not claim a lack of jurisdiction, although such jurisdiction is not at all straightforward (there was no precedent of a national court willing to hear petitions from inhabitants of occupied territories). The Court assumed such jurisdiction, which was neither challenged in court since nor revoked by legislation or by military commands in the territories.
The result is that in matters connected to the Occupied Territories, the Court serves, on the one hand, as a legitimizing tool, both domestically and internationally, especially when harsh administrative measures are imposed. On the other hand, the Court serves as a body to which blame can be shifted, when unpopular (especially within Israel) decisions are given, protecting the human rights of the inhabitants of the Territories. Thus, with the help of the Court, the government can meet some of the international demands from Israel with respect to its policies in the Territories. In the context of state and religion, on top of the blame-shift explanation, the Court also solves social choice problems within the political bodies, which are the result of the coalitiongovernment structure of Israeli politics. Even the Court's power to review legislation as conflicting with basic human rights can be interpreted using this model. In all of these cases, politicians could have done much more to block the Court from intervening, to limit its jurisdiction, etc., but rational politicians understood that delegating public decisionmaking to the Court in these area benefits the politicians. How can the empirical study of decision-making patterns of temporary appointees to the Israeli Supreme Court shed some light on this theoretical debate between the traditional and revisionist approaches? According to the traditional approach to the independence of the judiciary, we can expect that the temporary judges will show the smallest degree of substantive independence. Furthermore, according to this approach, we would expect to find that those temporary appointees who show too much independence would have less chance of obtaining a permanent appointment. This is because, according to the traditional approach, judicial independence plays against the interest of politicians, and thus, they would tend to penalize it.
According to the revisionist approach to the independence of the judiciary, we can expect that temporary appointees would not be less independent and that no negative correlation would be found between their degree of substantive independence and their promotion chances. Indeed, if judicial independence is viewed positively by politicians they would tend to reward it, i.e. promote the more independent judges.
Before specifying the results from our empirical study, I will briefly describe the database which was the basis of the study.
III. On the Database Used for this Study
The database used for this study was created by Professor Arye Rattner, from the Department of Sociology at the University of Haifa, and myself in a context of a more comprehensive study of the work of the Supreme Court of Israel and its judges.
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Legal scholars have always shown great interest in Supreme Court decisions, from which one can learn a great deal about the legal system and its course of changes. Traditionally, though, legal scholars' major interest is centered on well-reasoned judicial decisions, which set a new precedent, which develop a new line of reasoning, or which are based on interesting theoretical analysis. The media is interested in those judicial decisions that deal with delicate political matters or controversial 32 A general description of the tasks and methodology of this study can be found in: A.
Rattner and E. Salzberger, "Supreme Court Decision-Making: A Realistic Point of View" An interim Report, Working Paper, the Center for the Study of Crime, Law and Society, University of Haifa (2000), and "Judicial Decision-Making in the Israeli Supreme Court: A Realistic Point of View from a Longitudinal Perspective" http:// hevra.haifa.ac.il/soc/LawSociety/June-99/rattner%20 and%20Salzberger.htm.
moral issues or in those cases which involve colorful stories. 33 The traditional evaluation and mapping of court decisions, as well as of the approaches of individual judges -from a professional, ideological, and doctrinal point of view -is based on such key decisions. These decisions are usually also published in the official law reports. In Israel the official law reports contain less than 15 percent of the cases dealt with by the Supreme Court.
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In reality there are many more Court rulings than the traditionally researched and reported ones. Conventional legal research, as well as media coverage, therefore, does not result in a genuine picture of the actual influence of judges and courts on the "legal situation" and on our private and public domains. The official publication of the Supreme Court decisions does not allow an accurate assessment of the impact of the Court as an institution or of the dispersal of its attention to various issues and litigants. Nor can we assess individual judges and their "real" influence on judicial, social, and political policies in such areas as human rights, penal policy, and social ideology. A judge, for example, that gained the reputation of a liberal judge in penal matters, based on one or two cases, might be found to have a very different position after evaluating the statistics of all her decisions in the penal cases heard by her.
The statistical findings from the work of the Israeli Supreme Court and its judges can tell us a different story from the ones that emerge from a selective reading of its published decisions. Such a claim was first made by the American Realist movement, which peaked in the middle of the twentieth century.
35 American legal realists, in numerous 33 There are often gaps between the legal formalist attention to Supreme Court decisions and the attention given to court decisions by the media and public. Many cases which find consternation in the general public are only one or two line judgments, which will not enter the mausoleum of leading cases and might not even be published in the law reports. The impact of the Supreme Court on the public discourse does not fully correspond to its formal product -reasoned judgments. 34 According to the data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. In Israel the official law reports are currently published by the Bar. Thus, the Bar is instrumental in deciding which are the cases to be published. 35 For a survey of this movement see Robert Summers (ed.), American Legal Theory (New York, 1992 theoretical writings, called for empirical studies to examine the "real" effects of legal institutions. Indeed, during the fifties and sixties a growing body of research examined legal issues using various methodologies of the social sciences. 36 However, such studies were conducted almost exclusively in the American context. During recent decades, with the rise of the economic approach to law, 37 which is another offspring of the Realist movement, we have been witnessing again the demand for the use of empirical-statistical studies with an aim to validate new legal theories by empirical ways.
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Although Legal Realism, Jurimetrics, and empirical Economic Analysis of Law are not new disciplines, very little has been done in the Israeli context using these schools of thought. The vast majority of writings about the Israeli Supreme Court, its decisions, and judges, is based on the traditional theoretical approaches, and even new approaches discussing court decisions, which broke the barrier of legal formalism, are still based on the traditional source of reasoned, publicized cases. The vast majority of court decisions, including those of the Supreme Court, remain hidden from the public eye, or from academic research. A significant exception to this picture is the longitudinal work by Yoram Shachar, Ron Harris, and Meron Gross on the Israeli Supreme Court.
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Shachar, Harris, and Gross used a sample of 8000 published decisions of the Court between 1948-1994. 40 This is the main methodological 41 From our database it emerges that dissenting opinions can be found only in less than one percent of the cases. Thus, in practice the Court talks in one voice. The differences in the statistics are not surprising, as it is likely that all cases with a dissenting opinion will find their way to the Law Reports, and, thus, their representation in the published segment of cases will be much higher than among all cases.
The current research is the first comprehensive research focusing on an analysis of the work and impact of the Israeli Supreme Court since 1948, as reflected by all its decisions (rather than only by its published ones). To be more accurate, due to budgetary constraints, we collected data on about a third of the cases dealt with by the Supreme Court since its establishment in 1948 and until today. We decided to collect data for three or four complete years from every decade, rather than scrutinizing part of the cases from every year. This will enable a future extension of the database. The database contains at present 47,782 cases. From each judgment we coded the identity of the litigants, the subject matter, the type of proceedings, the lower court's decision, and parameters on the individual ruling of each of the judges who heard the case. This database enables us to analyze the work of the Court as an institution and to examine the individual profiles of each judge who served on the Court, as well as the dynamics of various combinations of judges.
One last remark: I am aware of the shortcomings of such a statistical approach. For example, it attributes the same weight to a decision which was never read by anyone, save the parties involved, and a decision which was publicized and debated by scholars, politicians, the media, and the general public. 42 However, I believe that the statistics 41 Shachar, Harris, and Gross, Iyunei Mishpat, supra n. 39, at 755. 42 It should be mentioned that there is also no correlation between the decisions of the Court which are the bread and butter of the formalist approach to legal research, and can tell a story of its own, which can indeed contribute to the overall assessment of the work of the Supreme Court and its judges.
IV. Decision-Making Patterns of Temporary Appointments and Judicial Independence
From its establishment in 1948 and up to today, 49 full-appointment judges have sat on the benches of the Israeli Supreme Court. 19 judges have not been on a temporary appointment prior to their permanent appointment, and 30 judges served on a temporary basis prior to their full appointment. 20 judges served on the Supreme Court in a temporary position and were not granted permanent appointment. The details of the judges are specified in Table 1 . From the table one can notice that many of the judges who were appointed to a permanent position on the Supreme Court without a prior temporary appointment came to the Court without a prior judicial background. They came from academia or from positions such as the Attorney General, State Attorney, or as other high rank legal officers. The exceptions (save the first judges appointed to the Court in 1948) are those judges who can be classified as representatives of special groups -Orthodox or Sephardic. 43 The chances of a temporary appointee to receive a permanent chair on the Supreme Court are, thus, above 50 percent: out of 50 temporary appointees, 30 got a permanent appointment.
For the purpose of examining the decision-making patterns at the Supreme Court, especially in the context of the theoretical debate about judicial independence, I divided the judges into 4 groups: Presidents and deputy Presidents, tenured judges, temporary judges who were eventually promoted to the Supreme Court, and temporary appointments who were not appointed later as judges in the Supreme Court. The four those particular decisions which have a highly significant impact on public decisionmaking and policy. In many cases decisions which are important from the perspective of political influence are recorded as one line rulings (such as "the appellant withdrew her application. There is no order for costs") and do not get published at all, thus left out of the formalist study of the Court. The most independent judges are the Presidents and the deputy Presidents of the Court. In addition to all the components of structural independence which they share with the other tenured judges (tenure, no reduction in salaries etc.) they can be characterized as those who reached the top of the judicial hierarchy. Thus, unlike other judges, they do not strive for promotion within this hierarchy and they are not dependent on their fellow judges. 45 The tenured judges in the Court enjoy all the components of structural judicial independence, as all the other judges in Israel, but their structural independence is greater than lower courts'judges, as they do not have further aspirations for promotion within the judicial hierarchy. However, these judges are dependent on the President and deputy President on matters such as assignment of cases, extra judicial posts such as heading official investigation committees, and in all matters derived from the administrative hierarchy in the Court.
The temporary appointees do not enjoy all the components of judicial independence, especially in the light of the fact that in most cases their year at the Supreme Court serves as a test period to examine their capabilities as possible Supreme Court judges. They are, therefore, dependent on the other judges of the Court who have a significant input Nos. 2-3,2001] TEMPORAEY APPOINTMENTS 5 0 1 in the appointments committee, and they are also dependent on the politicians and the Bar who are represented in this committee. According to the traditional approach to the positive analysis of judicial independence, we can expect to find the greatest substantive independence in the decision-making patterns of the Presidents and deputy Presidents of the Court and the lowest substantive independence in the decision-making patterns of the temporary appointees. Furthermore, according to this model, we can expect lower substantive independence among those temporary appointments who eventually got a permanent seat on the Court, in comparison to those temporary appointees who did not get such a seat. According to this approach, those judges who show conformity, on the one hand, towards the government and, on the other hand, towards their senior colleagues in the Court improve their chances for a permanent chair.
According to the revisionist approach to the positive analysis of judicial independence, in its different versions, we can expect to see those temporary appointments who show more substantive independence, as the judges who will gain permanent seats on the Supreme Court. In other words, according to this approach, those who are more substantively independent will get the desirable appointment, or at least we will not find an opposite correlation.
I will focus here on four variables of judicial decision-making, all of them calculated on the level of individual judicial opinions: 46 (1) the percentage of High Court decisions in which the application is allowed, (2) the percentage of appeals in which the judgment of the lower court is overturned, (3) the percentage of dissenting opinions, and (4) the percentage of cases in which the judge wrote an elaborate opinion (as opposed to mere concurrence). The first three variables are proxies for substantive judicial independence, both vis-a-vis the government (reflected by the percentage of successful High Court applications, most of which are against the central government or one of its departments) and vis-a-vis the other judges (reflected by dissenting opinions and to a lesser degree the rate of reversing lower courts' decisions). The last variable is a proxy for judicial quality as well as independence from the 46 In other words, each decision of the Court was broken down into three or more individual opinions (according to the number of judges who sat on the bench). When a collective decision was given without mentioning who was the judge who wrote it (as opposed to a judgment written by one of the judges, followed by "I concur" by the other judges), it is related to all the judges on the bench. other judges. It can be hypothesized that better judges would write more elaborate decisions rather than concurring with the other judges on the bench 47 and that the more independent judges will also write a higher proportion of elaborate opinions.
Let us now examine the results:
A. The Rate of Allowing High Court Applications
Applications to the Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice are the main legal battleground between the citizens and the government. A higher individual rate of allowing applications can indicate a greater substantive judicial independence whose object is the government and vice versa. Table 2 presents the rates of allowing and dismissing High Court applications according to the four categories of judges.
The most significant figure from Table 2 is the general low rate of success at the High Court of Justice. Only 10.8 percent of the applications were successful (or partially successful), while 60.4 percent were dismissed and 28.8 percent ended with no decision, i.e., were either withdrawn or ended with a compromise.
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However there are interesting differences among the different categories of judges with regard to this variable. While the temporary appointments that were eventually promoted to a permanent seat in the Court are the most "generous" in allowing such applications, with 12.4 percent of the cases being successful, the temporary appointees who were not promoted are the least "generous" with only 9 percent of application allowed. This amounts to a difference of approximately 30 percent between the two groups of judges. Furthermore, the success rate of applications for the temporary 47 Since we cover in this study all types of Supreme Court cases, even under the assumption that the judge who is initially assigned to write the decision is the "specialist" in the area of law in question, the aggregate of elaborate opinions can be a good indicator for overall judicial quality. 48 For a possible explanation for the low success rate at the High Court of Justice see Yoav Dotan, "Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice during the Intifada" (1999) 33(2) Law and Society Review 319. Dotan asserts that in most cases against the central government and its departments, the High Court department at the Attorney General's office serves as a mini-court. The lawyers there impose on the government the appropriate actions when they think that the application ought to be allowed and the Supreme Court judges trust their discretion. Thus, if the application does arrive to be litigated in the Supreme Court, the chances that it would be allowed are slim.
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The findings correspond to the revisionist approach to judicial independence. It seems that the more independent judges (vis-d-vis the government) are rewarded through promotion. Since the representatives of the government and the legislature take part in the promotion decision (and traditionally their consent is needed for an appointment to the Supreme Court), one can conclude that politicians opt for independent judges. Table 3 presents the percentage of criminal and civil appeals in which the judges overturned the decision of a lower court (usually a decision of the district court -from which the temporary appointees come). 50 In criminal appeals there is almost no difference in the reversal rate of the temporary appointees who were promoted, 27.6 percent, and the temporary appointees who were not promoted, 27.7 percent, and in fact, this rate is very similar to the 27.9 percent of the tenured judges. Only the Presidents and deputy President have a lower reversal rate of 25.0 percent.
B. The Rate of Reversal of Lower Courts' Decisions
However, there are significant differences in the reversal rate of civil appeals. While temporary appointees who were promoted overturn 26.5 percent of civil appeals, the temporary appointees who were not promoted overturn only 18.1 percent -a difference of almost 50 percent. The reversal rate of the regular judges and the President and deputy Presidents is much closer to the reversal rate of the temporary judges who were promoted -26.4 percent and 28.3 percent respectively.
Again, it seems that the more independent judges, this time independence in the sense of being judicially activist, are rewarded, a finding which fits the revisionist model of judicial independence. Another significant figure emerges from Table 2 -namely, the percentage of cases in which the judge refrained from a decision as to the merit of the case (civil appeals which were withdrawn or compromised -very often under the pressure of the judges assigned to the case). Temporary appointees who were not promoted hold the highest rate of 45.3 percent, while temporary appointees who were promoted have a much lower rate of 30 percent, regular judges -23.8 percent and Presidents and deputy Presidents -only 18.9 percent. Similar results as to the difference between temporary appointees who were promoted and temporary appointees who were not promoted can be drawn from the criminal appeals. One can conclude again that the more restrictive judges have lower chances to be promoted and vice versa, a conclusion, which can be accommodated with the revisionist approach.
C. Dissenting Opinions
The rate of cases in which the judges wrote a dissenting opinion is another indication for substantive judicial independence, this time visa-vis the other judges on the bench. The figures for the four categories of judges according to the three types of cases are presented in Table 4 , where Table 6 summarizes these rates for all the cases. The most significant finding here is the very low rate of dissenting opinions: only in 0.6 percent of the individual opinions was a dissenting opinion written, whereas the highest general dissenting rate is 0.9 percent in civil appeals and the lowest general dissenting rate is in High Court cases -0.4 percent.
The temporary appointees who were promoted hold a dissenting rate of 0.7 percent, while the temporary appointees who were not promoted have a dissenting rate of 0.8 percent, the regular judges -0.6 percent and the Presidents and deputy Presidents -0.3 percent. The number of decisions in which dissenting opinions were written is so small that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. However, it seems that if there is any logic behind the differences it is a negative correlation between the dissenting rate and structural independence. In other words, writing more dissenting opinions does not help to increase the chances of promotion.
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and even lower than half of the dissenting rate of the temporary judges. A possible explanation for this finding is not that the Presidents and deputy Presidents are less independent than the other judges, but that the other judges will be more hesitant to disagree with a judgment of the President or deputy President than disagree with other judges. In other words, judges -tenured as well as temporary -will tend to adjust their opinions to agree with the most senior judges in the Court or on the bench, and this is the reason for the very small rates of dissenting opinions among all judges. If conclusions can be drawn here, then they relate to the lack of internal independence or the existence of dependence of the regular judges (tenured as well as temporary) on the senior judges of the Court. This "dependence" is also reflected in the promotion policies -judges who are more conformist with the senior judges of the Court have slightly better chances to get a permanent seat in the Court.
D. Elaborate Decisions
The last variable examined in this context is the rate of decisions in which a separate elaborate individual opinion was written, in contrast to a mere concurrence or a collective judgment. Unlike the previous variables, this one can be perceived not only as a proxy for independence (vis-a-vis the other judges on the bench); it can be perceived also as a proxy for judicial quality. The assumption here is that better judges will have a higher rate of decisions in which they write an elaborated opinion, instead of adding "I concur" to other judges' opinions. In most cases there is one leading opinion to which the other judges on the bench subscribe. It is not unreasonable to assume that better judges are assigned the leading role in judgment writing more often than lesser judges. Table 6 presents the statistics for all the cases.
From Table 6 there emerges a clear relationship between the status of a judge and the rate of elaborated opinions written by him or by her. Presidents and deputy Presidents wrote elaborate opinions in 32.8 percent of the decisions in which they participated. Tenured judges wrote elaborate opinions in 17.4 percent of the decisions. But the surprising result is that while temporary appointees who were later promoted wrote elaborate opinions in 15.7 percent of their decisions, for temporary appointees who were not promoted this figure is 24.2 percent -well above the tenured judges in the Court. In other words, if writing elaborate opinions is an indication of judicial quality it seems that the better temporary judges are not promoted to a permanent position on
the Court. Likewise, if the rate of elaborate opinions is another proxy for independence from the other judges in Court, than the conclusion is similar to the one we drew from the rates of dissenting opinions -that internal judicial independence, unlike external independence, is not rewarded; on the contrary, it is a drawback.
When we look at the elaborate opinions' rates for each type of case ( Table 5 ) it emerges that in civil appeals the results resemble the total rate of elaborate opinions. The temporary appointees who were not promoted wrote elaborate opinions in 30.9 percent of their decisions, while the temporary appointees who were promoted wrote elaborate opinions in only 21.6 percent of their decisions. The ratio is reversed for High Court cases, in which temporary judges who were not promoted wrote elaborate opinions in 7.6 percent of the cases, while temporary judges who were promoted wrote elaborate opinions in 10.7 percent of their decisions. The same applies to criminal appeals -9.8 percent for those who were promoted versus 8.2 percent for those who were not promoted.
It is difficult to draw decisive conclusions from these conflicting findings. If we view the rate of writing elaborate opinions as a proxy for quality than one possible hypothesis is that High Court cases and criminal appeals play a more important role in the assessment of judicial quality. Indeed, these are the cases which attract more public or media attention. If this is so, the hypothesis regarding the correlation between quality and chances of promotion cannot be entirely rejected. As I will elaborate below, in a similar research on the judges of the English Court of Appeal the equivalent sort of difficulties emerged with regard to the same variable, which makes this puzzle even more intriguing.
V. Comparative Perspective -The English Court of Appeal
It is interesting to compare the empirical findings from the Israeli Supreme Court to a parallel study that I conducted together with Professor Paul Fenn on the judges of the English Court of Appeal and their chances to be promoted to the judicial committee of the House of Lords. 51 In this study we examined the decision-making patterns of the judges of the English Court of Appeal, the second judicial instance in Britain, which is below the judicial committee of the House of Lords. Unlike the current study, the English one was based only on the public law judgments of the Court of Appeal, i.e., cases in which the central government or one of its departments was involved (in contrast to all types of appeals in the Israeli study). But as in the current study we used all the relevant decisions, not only the published ones, from 1951 to 1988. The main purpose of the study was to test the correlation between several variables in the individual decision-making records of judges and their chances to be promoted to the House of Lords -the highest judicial instance in Britain. The major difference between the two studies (in addition to the fact that in the English one only public law cases -the equivalent of High Court of Justice cases in Israel -were examined), was that in the English case the dependent variable was promotion to the House of Lords, rather than getting a tenured position in the Court.
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The variables examined can be divided into two types -variables which can measure substantive judicial independence and those which can be regarded as proxies for judicial quality. Among the second group of variables, in addition to the rate of elaborated opinion (BOPINION), we also examined the age of the judge at his first judicial appointment (FIRSTJA) and his age at appointment to the Court of Appeal (APPOINTCA), assuming that younger appointments indicate higher judicial quality. Another variable in this group was the productivity of a judge as measured by the number of decisions handed down by him annually (DECYEAR). We also included in this group of "quality proxies" variables the rate of decisions of individual judges that were overturned by the House of Lords (REVHL). If the decisions of the House of Lords are a declaration on the current "state of the law" than the rate of overruling lower courts' decision can be an indication of the quality of the overruled judges.
With regard to the variables measuring judicial independence, we distinguished between several variables measuring different degrees of independence: the rate of decisions of lower courts which were given for the government and overturned by the judge in the Court of Appeal to be 52 In the English case we examined not only whether the judge was promoted to the House of Lords, but also the length of time until such a promotion. See the article in the Journal of Law and Economics, ibid. Is.L.R. Vol. 35 decided against the government (REVAGA), the rate of decisions of lower courts against the government which were affirmed by the Court of Appeal (AFFAGA), and the rate of decisions in lower courts against the government which were overturned by the Court of Appeal and decided for the government (REVFOR). This sub-categorization can distinguish between a strong form of independence (or dependence) vis-a-vis the government (represented by the rate of overturning lower courts' decisions in favor of the government and deciding them against the government and overturning lower courts' decision against the government and deciding in favor of the government), and a weaker form of independence (affirming lower courts' decisions against the government). In order to examine the correlation between the decision-making variables and the chances for promotion to the House of Lords a Cox's proportional hazards regression was constructed. Its results are presented in Table 7 . 53 The findings turned out to be similar to the findings of the current research. Variables which can be regarded as proxies for substantive judicial independence whose object is the government, were, generally, positively correlated to the chances of promotion. More specifically, a significant negative correlation was found between the rate of overturning lower courts' decisions against the government and deciding for it (REVFOR) and promotion chances, 54 and positive correlation was found between affirming lower court's decisions against the government (AFFAGA) and promotion. However, it was found that too much independence, measured by overturning lower courts' decision in favor of the government and deciding against it (REVAGA) reduces the promotion chances. A possible explanation to the latter finding is that generally independence is rewarded, save rebellious judges who systematically overturn only decisions in favor of the government. Such conduct may lower the promotion chances.
A particularly interesting finding was the positive correlation between the rate of concurring opinions, in contrast to elaborate judgments (BOPINION), and promotion chances. In other words, similar to 53 In the Journal of Law and Economics, supra n. 51, we presented a more complicated model, measuring not only a dichotomous decision of promotion, but also a time factor -after how many years in the Court of Appeal the judge was promoted (if he was).
In order to avoid the technical complexities of this survival analysis, I present here a more simple model, which was not published before. It is noteworthy that the results of the more complicated model and the current one are similar. 54 A significant result is when pr>Chi square is lower than 5%.
Nos. [2] [3] 2001] TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS 509 the surprising finding from the Israeli Supreme Court, the rate of writing an elaborate opinion was found to be negatively correlated to the chances of promotion. If this rate can indicate judicial independence visa-vis the other judges in the court, then one can conclude that such independence does not contribute to promotion chances. If this variable can be regarded as a proxy for quality then it can be concluded that judicial quality is not taken on board when promotion is considered. However, in the English research, as explained above, we tested other, more eloquent, proxies for judicial quality, the most significant of which was the rate of decisions which were subsequently overturned by the House of Lords. This variable does not have an equivalent in the Israeli study as this study focused on the highest judicial instance. This variable (REVHL) was found to be negatively correlated to the chances of promotion. In other words, a higher rate of decisions overturned by the House of lords lowered the promotion chances. In addition, the productivity of the judges (DECYEAR) was found to be significantly and positively correlated to promotion chances, and the age at appointment to the Court of Appeal was found to be negatively correlated, i.e., the younger the judge reaching the Court of Appeal, the higher his chances to be further promoted to the judicial committee of the House of Lords. 65 These findings can indicate that writing elaborate decision ought to be classified as a proxy for internal judicial independence, rather than as a proxy for judicial quality.
VI. Conclusions
The findings from the English Court of Appeal have strong similarities to the findings from the Israeli Supreme Court (including unexpected results in both cases) and tend to support the revisionist models of judicial independence. In both cases it was found that expressions of substantive independence whose object is the government, contribute to the chances of promotion while expressions of independence whose 55 We did not find a similar correlation between the age at first judicial appointment (FIRSTJA) and promotion chances. 56 Another possible explanation for the English results regarding elaborate opinions is the fact that our data included only public law decisions. The figures might have been different had we looked at all Court of Appeal decisions. Vol. 35 objects are the other judges in the court (measured by the rates of dissenting opinions and elaborated opinions) do not improve the chances for promotion; maybe even the opposite is true. In Britain, where promotion decisions are in the sole hands of the Lord Chancellor -a political figure -the findings may be of more significance. However, the customary rule in the committee recommending judicial appointments in Israel, according to which appointment to the Supreme Court has to be supported by a qualified majority of the committee -politicians and professionals -makes the Israeli results not less significant in the context of the rival explanations for judicial independence.
The empirical study of Israeli courts is in its infancy. The database that was the basis for this research is likely to produce more studies on the work of the Israeli Supreme Court and its judges. Yet, further studies of the work of lower courts is needed. The words of Morris Cohen, 50 years ago: "The law, and especially present American law, is desperately in need of scientific elaboration" are very relevant to the state of the research of the Israeli judicial system today. 1984(1982) 1988 (1986) 1989(1982) 1991(1989) 1994 (1993) 1994 (1963) 1994 (1989) 1994 (1984) 1995 (1980) 2000 (1999) 2001 (2000) 2001 (2000 
